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Consumer's Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum
Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute
During this century American courts increasingly have enforced fo-
rum selection clauses1 in contracts.2 Although traditionally rejected as
ousting courts of their jurisdiction, forum selection clauses gained ac-
ceptance through an effort by courts to maintain parties' expectations.
Nearly all cases upholding the clauses deal with commercial contracts
between business entities.4 Recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court examined the validity of such a provision on a cruise
ticket that, if enforced, would bind the passenger to litigate more than
2500 miles from her home state.
In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute5 the Court, sitting in admi-
ralty,6 extended the acceptance of forum clauses to include such a clause
on a cruise ticket. The majority held that enforcing forum selection
clauses is consonant with previous holdings and that such clauses pro-
mote judicial and social economy,7 while two dissenting justices found
1. Forum selection clauses, also known as choice of forum clauses or forum clauses, are
provisions in contracts which mandate that all suits arising under the contract be filed in a
designated forum. See, e.g., Howard W. Schreiber, Appealability of a District Court's Denial of
a Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion: An Argument Against "Canceling Out" The
Bremen, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 463 n.3 (1988).
2. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41(a) (1959); James T. Gilbert,
Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 KY. L.J. 1, 7-19 (1976);
Ralph C. Oser, Recent Decision, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 309, 311-12 (1972).
3. See, eg., Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45
(3d Cir. 1966) ("[Forum selection clauses] should be respected as the responsible expression of
the intention of the parties"); Hernandez v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maat-
schappij N.V., 252 F. Supp. 652, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[R]ecent case law clearly indicates
that [forum selection clauses are] enforceable if reasonable."); Gilbert, supra note 2, at 16-19
(noting the trend toward judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses).
4. See eg., Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1288-89 (7th Cir.
1989) (lease of dairy equipment); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 510-
11 (9th Cir. 1988) (contract for international perfume dealership); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d
49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1986) (sale of limited partnerships); Sun World Lines v. March Shipping
Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) (contract for cruise ship charter); Bryant Elec. Co.
v. City of Fredricksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1192-93 (4th Cir. 1985) (governmental contract for
construction of aqueduct).
5. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
6. The claim arose at sea and therefore is governed by admiralty law, which falls within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3671 (1985) (discussing scope of admiralty jurisdiction). The federal stat-
ute conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the federal courts reads: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of... [a]ny civil case of admi-
ralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988).
7. See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
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the clause unfair.' This Note agrees with the dissenters, arguing that
previous cases upholding forum selection clauses are distinguished from
Shute in that they involved commercial contracts, typically between busi-
ness entities. 9 The application of such precedent in the consumer con-
text of cruise contracts is thus suspect. Instead, this Note concludes,
facts such as those posed in Shute require analysis under traditional con-
tractual and constitutional principles governing the enforceability of fo-
rum selection clauses.1" Such an analysis reveals that by neglecting
contract law dealing with adhesion and ignoring principles of due pro-
cess, the Shute Court abandoned the consumer's rights in an age of form
contracts and in a legal system that prefers the efficiency of justice rather
than its equity. 1
Eulala Shute and her husband Russel, citizens of the State of Wash-
ington, purchased cruise tickets through a Washington travel agent.12
The agent forwarded the Shutes' payment to Carnival Cruise Line's
(Carnival) headquarters in Miami, Florida.'3 Carnival then sent the
Shutes their tickets, which contained a forum selection clause requiring
that all suits relating to the cruise be litigated in Florida.'4 The Shutes
conceded notice of the forum selection clause. 5 The Shutes boarded a
Carnival ship in Los Angeles, sailed to Mexico, and returned to Los An-
geles. 6 While in international waters off Mexico, Eulala Shute was in-
jured when she slipped on a deck mat during a guided tour of the ship's
galley. 1
7
Mrs. Shute fied a negligence suit against Carnival in the United
8. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justice Marshall joined. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at
1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 59-100 and accompanying text.
'10. See infra notes 107-75 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 176-98 and accompanying text.
12. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
13. Id.
14. Id. The clause read:
"It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and
matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida,
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country."
Id. (quoting from the contract, which Justice Stevens appended to the end of his dissenting
opinion).
15. Id. at 1525. It is not clear whether the Shutes actually read the clause. If the Shutes
had denied notice, the Court would have had to determine if the clause was reasonably notice-
able. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
16. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
17. Id.
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States District Court for the Western District of Washington.1" The ba-
sis for jurisdiction was admiralty. 9 Carnival moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction and, in the alternative, to dismiss pursuant to the
forum selection clause on the ticket.20 The district court granted Carni-
val's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Car-
nival had insufficient contacts with the State of Washington.21 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that Carnival did have sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdic-
tion.2 In addition, the court of appeals ruled on the forum selection
clause, holding that since the clause "was not freely bargained for," it
was invalid.23 The appellate court also determined that the clause would
excessively inconvenience the Shutes.24 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to determine the validity of the forum selection clause,2 and ulti-
mately rejected the court of appeals' holding that a forum clause on a
cruise ticket is per se unenforceable.26 The Court emphasized the benefi-
cial aspects of forum clauses and concluded that, absent fraud, bad faith,
or overreaching, forum clauses will be upheld even in a consumer
context.27
The Court began by reviewing the reasoning of the court of appeals.
The appellate court had determined that the clause was invalid since its
inclusion was not negotiated.28 The Court rejected this holding; finding
18. Id. The district court did not fie an opinion.
19. See supra note 6.
20. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
21. Id.
22. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377, 382-83 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 11l S. Ct.
1522 (1991). Washington's long-arm statute reads: "Any person, . . . who in person or
through an agent does any of the [following]. . . submits. . . to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state. . . (a) m11he transaction of any business within this state." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.28.185 (1988). Commentators considered personal jurisdiction to be the most significant
issue in Shute. See, eg., Mary Lou Johnson, Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over the Nonresident:
Washington Contributes Shoe and Shute, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 243, 255-56 (1991). At least one
commentator has recognized the Court's decision to enforce the forum selection clause as a
method of avoiding the difficult issue of personal jurisdiction. Linda S. Mullenix, Forum-
Shoppers Should Discover a Wider Market, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S12 ("Playing
chicken in the briar patch, [the Court] resolved the jurisdiction issue by deciding the narrow
question of the scope and validity of the passenger ticket's forum-selection clause.").
23. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1522 (1991).
24. Id.
25. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
26. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
27. Id. at 1528; see infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing Court's fundamental
fairness test).
28. The appellate court found that under The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972), only a freely negotiated forum selection clause should be enforced. Carnival Cruise
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it unreasonable to assume that any cruise passenger would negotiate his
contract, the Court held that negotiation is not an appropriate require-
ment of a cruise ticket.29 The Court also rejected the court of appeals's
determination that the clause was too inconvenient to be enforced.30 The
Court concluded that the plaintiff had not met the "heavy burden of
proof" needed to invalidate a forum clause on the grounds of
inconvenience.31
The Court then enumerated the benefits of forum selection clauses.32
First, it noted that since passengers on a cruise line are from many lo-
cales, without the forum clauses the cruise line could be subject to litiga-
tion in several different forums.33 Second, the Court explained that
forum clauses obviate confusion and litigation over which forum is cor-
rect.34 Third, the Court stated that the clauses result in lower fares to
passengers because of the resulting reduced legal costs to the cruise
line.35
The Court then stated that choice of forum clauses will be scruti-
Lines v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). For a discussion of The Bremen, see infra notes 67-80 and accompany-
ing text.
29. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
30. The Court pointed to the court of appeals' reliance on standards set forth in The
Bremen, which stated that a forum selection clause will be invalid if it is so inconvenient that it
deprives a plaintiff of his day in court. Id. at 1527-28 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,
897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), and The Bremen, 407 U.S. at
17). See infra note 79 and accompanying text for this discussion in The Bremen.
31. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. The appellate court had determined that the Shutes "are
physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litigation in Florida." Id. at 1527 (citing
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377, 389 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991)). The Supreme Court stated that the district court reported no findings on this matter.
Id. at 1528. The Court also stated that in The Bremen references to convenience were made in
a hypothetical case involving two Americans contracting to litigate in a "'remote alien fo-
rum." Id. (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17). The Court implicitly retained the defense
of inconvenience to invalidate forum selection clauses, but did not articulate clearly the level of
inconvenience required. Additionally, the Court did not explain whether the source of the
inconvenience argument was contractual, see infra notes 115-40 (discussing the claim that
forum clauses are adhesive), or constitutional, see infra notes 141-75 (discussing the claim that
forum clauses violate due process).
32. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
33. Id.; see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
34. Shute, Ill S. Ct. at 1527; see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
35. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527; see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. The Court
did not indicate how the clauses would save legal costs, but presumably it meant savings of
travel and the costs arising from distant litigation. As a practical matter, though, the forum
clauses also could serve as a deterrent to suit, thereby lowering amount of damage claims paid.
See, e.g., Yoder v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986); see
also infra note 198 (noting that forum clauses deter suits and discussing the Yoder court's view
on this issue).
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nized only for fundamental fairness.3 6 The majority asserted that Carni-
val had not inserted the clause with the intent to discourage suits."
Additionally, the Court dismissed any possibility of fraud or overreach-
ing, finding no evidence to support such claims.38 The Court added that
since Mrs. Shute had notice of the clause, she presumably could have
"reject[ed] the contract with impunity."39
Finally, the majority addressed Shute's argument that the forum se-
lection clause violates the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act.'
The Court stated that a plain language reading indicates that the Act was
intended only to prevent ship owners from limiting liability for negli-
gence and from forcing passengers to submit to arbitration.41 The major-
ity found no authority indicating that the Act was passed "to avoid
having a plaintiff travel to a distant forum."'42 Noting that the clause
does not deny a plaintiff a judicial forum and that the clause does not
purport to limit liability for negligence, the Court concluded that the
clause does not violate the Act.43
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which he asserted that a forum
selection clause on a cruise ticket is unenforceable under principles of
admiralty law.' Justice Stevens further explained that forum selection
clauses in passenger tickets "involve the intersection of two strands of
36. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. Aside from giving examples of what does not constitute
fundamental fairness, the Court failed to clarify what is meant by fundamental fairness. The
Court also did not indicate whether the fundamental fairness scrutiny is a result of contractual
principles, see infra notes 115-40 (discussing adhesion), or constitutional principles, see infra
notes 141-75 (discussing due process).
37. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1528. In support of its determination, the Court pointed to the
facts that Carnival's principal place of business was in Florida, and that its cruises departed
from and returned to Florida ports. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Justice Stevens disagreed with this conclusion. Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see infra text accompanying note 131.
40. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988). The Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act makes
it "unlawful for [an] owner of any vessel... [to] purport[] ... to lessen, weaken, or avoid the
right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction." Id. The Act generally
protects passengers from the predatory practices of ship owners. See infra notes 107-112 and
accompanying text.
41. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens began by noting that exculpatory clauses
in passenger tickets have been void since the turn of the century as contrary to public policy.
Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He analogized forum selection clauses to other clauses
that are recognized as void: clauses limiting liability, clauses requiring notice to be filed within
a short period of time, and clauses mandating a choice of law that is favorable to the defendant
in negligence cases. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183b(a), 183c (1988)
and The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 269 (1902) ).
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traditional contract law that qualify the general rule that courts will en-
force" contract terms.4" First, Justice Stevens pointed out that courts
generally disfavor contracts in which there is little bargaining power and
no meaningful choice.41 Second, he restated the traditional principle that
forum selection clauses deprive the courts of their jurisdiction.47 Even in
light of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,4s he wrote, forum clauses
are not enforceable if they are not bargained for freely, if they create
additional expense for one party, or if they deny one party a remedy.49
Justice Stevens also maintained that the clause is void under the
Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act.5 0 Justice Stevens asserted
that enforcement of the clause lessens or weakens plaintiff's ability to
recover, thereby rendering the clause void under the Act."1 He sup-
ported this interpretation of the Act by referring to the House Report,52
which enunciated that the legislative intent was to disallow limitation of
liability and to "'put a stop to all such practices.' "I' Justice Stevens
concluded that even absent the Act, such a clause on a passenger ticket
should be void. 4
Shute represents an extension of the modem cases that condone fo-
rum selection clauses.55 Historically, courts have viewed provisions lim-
iting their authority, especially forum selection and arbitration clauses,
as attempts to oust courts of their jurisdiction; consequently, courts have
treated such provisions with animosity. 6 Under the widely criticized
45. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1530-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 115-40 (discussing adhesion).
47. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This argument has been abandoned
by courts and commentators. See infra note 57. Justice Stevens distinguished The Bremen on
the grounds that it had involved two international corporations entering an agreement which
had been the product of free negotiation. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For a discussion of The Bremen, see infra notes 67-80 and accom-
panying text.
49. Shute, 11l S. Ct. at 1531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's conclusion is too
broad and is not supported by case law. While some courts have refused to enforce forum
clauses, most forum clauses are enforced. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. Be-
cause it is difficult to imagine a situation where litigating away from one's home forum would
entail no extra cost, Justice Stevens's conclusion would invalidate nearly all forum selection
clauses.
50. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1988). For the relevant language of
the Act, see supra note 40.
52. H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936).
53. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2517).
54. Id. at 1533 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. See infra notes 59-106 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., French v. LaFayette Ins. Co., 9 F. Cas. 788, 789 (C.C.D. Ind. 1853) (No.
5102) ("Why has a condition or an agreement in a policy, providing that all disputes arising
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justification of public policy, courts refused to enforce clauses that re-
stricted judicial activity. 7 The gradual acceptance of clauses limiting ju-
dicial authority was evidenced in the field of arbitration by the passage of
the Federal Arbitration Act in 1947;58 soon thereafter, courts began to
follow suit in the area of forum selection clauses.
The first significant case to uphold a contract clause waiving per-
sonal jurisdiction was National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent. 9
National Equipment, whose principal place of business was in New
York, entered into a farm equipment lease with Szukhent, a resident of
Michigan.' The contract included a clause assigning Szukhent an agent
for service of process in New York,6 the purpose of which was to confer
personal jurisdiction over Szukhent, thereby assuring that any litigation
under the contract would be conducted in New York.62 The Court up-
held the clause over due process objections, 63 stating that "parties to a
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to
waive notice altogether."'  Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the
clause was a sham and that the manifest unequal bargaining power
should render the clause unenforceable. 65 Three other justices, in a sec-
ond dissenting opinion, asserted that Szukhent's signature on the form
under it shall be referred to arbitration, been held to be void? Because it is an attempt to oust
the jurisdiction of the court."), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
57. See, eg., 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1431, at 381-82 (1962)
("How can two individuals by private agreement limit or otherwise alter the 'jurisdiction' of
the great courts of state or nation!"); EHRENZWEIG, supra note 2, § 41(a), at 145-47 (stating
that the ouster theory is not rational); Gilbert, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that ouster theory has
no basis and suggesting a more likely reason judges retained jurisdiction was that their pay was
based on the number of cases they heard).
58. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. I 1990)). The Act states, "A written provision in any...
contract [agreeing] to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This wholesale endorsement
of arbitration agreements represents a marked departure from the previous hostility courts
held toward such agreements. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (dealing with
acceptance of arbitration).
59. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
60. Id. at 312-13.
61. Id. at 312.
62. Id. at 315.
63. Id. at 329-33 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that forcing the defendants to litigate in
New York, by means of a clause in fine print on a contract, raises questions of due process in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
64. Id. at 316.
65. Id. at 323, 326 (Black, J., dissenting).
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did not justify a waiver of personal jurisdiction.66 Although Szukhent
dealt with waiver of personal jurisdiction, and not with exclusivity of
venue, the case reflected the Court's willingness to uphold clauses limit-
ing judicial authority.
Having dispelled any notion that it would refuse to enforce a waiver
of personal jurisdiction, in 1972 the Court squarely addressed the aspect
of forum selection clauses dealing with exclusivity of venue in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.67 Unterweser, a German corporation,
agreed to tow a drilling rig to Italy for Zapata, a Houston-based corpora-
tion.68 The contract included a forum selection clause stating that any
dispute arising from the contract would be litigated in England.69 When
Zapata filed suit in Florida for damages incurred during a storm, Un-
terweser moved to dismiss pursuant to the clause.70 Reversing an eight-
to-six en banc decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,71 the Court found that the forum selection clause should be
upheld.72
The Court reasoned that invalidating such clauses would impair the
ability of American corporations to trade in world markets.7 Addition-
ally, the Court stated that the contract was between "experienced and
sophisticated businessmen" and accented the principle of freedom to con-
tract.74 The Court explicitly rejected the theory that such clauses oust a
66. Id. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Brennan in his dissent were Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Goldberg. Justice Brennan wrote:
[S]ince the corporate plaintiff prepared the printed form contract, I would not hold
the individual purchaser bound by the appointment without proof, in addition to his
mere signature on the form, that the individual understandingly consented to be sued
in a State not that of his residence .... The sales pitch aims solely at getting the
signature on the form and wastes no time explaining or even mentioning the print.
Id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
68. Id. at 2. The Bremen was the name of the towing vessel owned by Unterweser. Id. at
3.
69. Id. at 2. Unterweser sent a proposed contract containing the forum clause to Zapata,
whereupon Zapata made some changes but left the forum clause intact. Id. at 2-3.
70. Id. at 3-4.
71. Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. The Bremen (In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH), 428 F.2d
888 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
72. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 8.
73. Id. at 9. The Court asserted that by accepting forum selection clauses, thereby harmo-
nizing American law with that of foreign nations, international trade would be encouraged
through greater predictability and uniformity. Id.; see infra note 192.
74. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11-12. The Court explained that "[tihere is strong evidence
that the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think
that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with
the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations." Id. at 14. In
defense of enforcing the clause, the Court stated, for example, "The choice of that forum was
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court of jurisdiction, explaining that courts upholding such clauses are
simply exercising their power to give effect to the legitimate expectations
of the parties.7" The Court also noted that in an international agreement,
there is a heightened possibility that one might be exposed to suit in a
foreign forum, a concern that further justifies using a predetermined fo-
rum to eliminate uncertainties.76 The Court held that forum selection
clauses are "prima facie valid,"77 and that they should be enforced unless
it is clear "that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or [un-
less] the clause [is] invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching. '78
The Court later stated that a party wishing to invalidate a clause on
grounds of inconvenience must show that he will for all practical pur-
poses be deprived of his day in court.79 The Bremen signified the chang-
ing tide in attitudes toward restrictions on judicial authority and served
as a jurisprudential lighthouse to lower courts faced with forum selection
clause dilemmas.80
In 1974 the Court reaffirmed its commitment to enforcing contrac-
tual agreements limiting jurisdiction in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co."l
Alberto-Culver, incorporated in Delaware, filed suit in Illinois against
Scherk, a German citizen, alleging violations of the Securities and Ex-
made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen... and...
it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts." Id. at 12.
75. Id. ('The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to 'oust' a court
of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.").
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id. at 15. This language resembles the "fundamental fairness" scrutiny mentioned in
Shute. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. In The Bremen, as in Shute, the foundation
for the fairness requirement is not explicit, but its derivations probably lie either in contract
law dealing with adhesion, see infra notes 115-40 and accompanying text, or in constitutional
law concerning due process, see infra notes 141-75 and accompanying text.
79. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. The requisite level of inconvenience was found by the
appellate court in Shute, but the Supreme Court rejected this determination. Shute, 111 S. Ct.
at 1528; see supra note 31 and accompanying text. Shute implicitly retains the requirement of
reasonableness, but since the Court held that forcing the Shutes to sue in Florida was not
unreasonable, it is clear that the Court demanded an elevated degree of unreasonableness to
invalidate such clauses. This reluctance to find forum clauses unreasonably inconvenient is rife
throughout lower opinions. See infra notes 104-05 (citing cases upholding forum clauses).
Only under extreme circumstances have courts found the requisite inconvenience. See, e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 343-44 (8th Cir.) (hold-
ing that Iran would not provide Americans a fair forum and, additionally, that Iran's war with
Iraq made litigation there dangerous), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
80. See, e-g., Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'g, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 168 (9th Cir. 1975);
Gaskin v. Stumm Handel, GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Stephen
R. Buckingham, Comment, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation: Judicial Discretion in
Forum Selection, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1379, 1385 (1989) ("The impact of the Court's decision
in [The Bremen] on the enforceability of forum selection clauses has been great.").
81. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
1992] FOR UM SELECTION CLA USES 897
change Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-
5.82 Scherk moved to dismiss under a contract clause providing that all
claims arising from the agreement were to be arbitrated in Paris. 3 In
addition to relying on authority from the Federal Arbitration Act, 4 the
Court, using the principles espoused in The Bremen, reasoned that in an
international agreement there are heightened needs for certainty and
that, therefore, arbitration clauses will be enforced. 5 Four dissenting
justices stated that the clause was inconsistent with the Securities Act
and therefore void.86 Although Scherk deals with arbitration, an arbitra-
tion clause is a form of forum selection clause.8 7 Scherk is significant in
that it reflected the Court's commitment to enforcing agreements limit-
ing judicial authority. In subsequent decisions concerning arbitration
82. Id. at 508-09.
83. Id.
84. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. II 1990); see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
85. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518-20. But see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (invalidating an
arbitration agreement). In Wilko a securities consumer alleged that his broker misrepresented
the future value of certain stocks, and the broker moved to stay the proceedings pursuant to an
arbitration agreement. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The Court ruled that in actions arising
under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides that any court can enforce suits
arising under that section, arbitration clauses are void since "the judicial forum is the kind of
'provision' that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Acts." Id. at 434-35. While the
Wilko Court acknowledged that the Federal Arbitration Act encourages arbitration, the Court
also stressed that the Securities Act was designed to afford buyers special protections, such as
reviewability, and that arbitration would usurp these safeguards. Id. at 435-37.
The Scherk Court took great lengths to distinguish its case from Wilko. The Court in
Scherk first noted that Wilko involved § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which has an
express private remedy, whereas Scherk involved the 1934 Act and rule lOb-5, which have
only implicit private remedies. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-14. The Court's principal argument,
though, was that Scherk involved an international contract, and that therefore the policies in
Scherk differed from those in Wilko. Id. at 515-16. Their reasoning for upholding arbitration
agreements was similar to that employed in The Bremen, see supra notes 73-74, finding that
enforcement of such clauses will lead to predictability and therefore increased international
transactions. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516. The Court, in a subsequent case, stated that "Scherk
supports [the] understanding that Vilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum
only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue." Shearson/
American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987). The Court also stressed that since
Wilko relied heavily on doubts concerning arbitration, "Wilko ... is difficult to square with
the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time." Id. at 233; see Leslie W.
More, Comment, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc- Is Arbitration Finally
Above Suspicion?, 78 Ky. L.J. 839, 864 (1990) (suggesting that arbitration is fair).
86. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 522, 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting, with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and White joining) ("Section 29 of the 1934 Act, which renders arbitration clauses void and
inoperative, recognizes no exception for fraudulent dealings which incidentally have some in-
ternational factors.").
87. Id. at 519 ("An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a special-
ized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure
to be used in resolving the dispute.").
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agreements, the Court maintained the bearing, set forth in The Bremen,
authorizing jurisdictional limitations. 8
The next case addressing the validity of the forum selection clause
was Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.8 9 Stewart, an Alabama
corporation, agreed to distribute copier products manufactured by
Ricoh, a New Jersey corporation.90 The contract contained a forum se-
lection clause stating that any action would be brought in New York
City.91 Stewart ified suit in Alabama claiming breach of contract, breach
of warranty, fraud, and antitrust violations. 92 Ricoh moved to transfer
the case to New York pursuant to the federal venue-transfer statute,93
relying on the forum selection clause.94 While the principal issue in
Stewart was whether federal courts should defer to state policy regarding
forum clauses in section 1404(a) transfers, the Court, in holding that fed-
eral law governs,9 5 also addressed the standard for transfer.96 The Court,
88. In 1985 in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985), the Court, over the dissent of Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall, held that an
arbitration clause in an international agreement encompasses claims under the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629. The Court, emphasizing
the international aspect of the agreement, stated, "[I]nternational comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context." Id. Two years later in McMahon the Court faced arbitration of securities and RICO
claims in a domestic context. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. The Court held that arbitration
offers a fair forum for these claims and that Congress had expressed no aversion toward arbi-
tration of such claims. Id. at 233, 238, 242. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 constitutes an exception to the Arbitration Act. Id. at 254-55 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (finding that the Wilko holding, discussed supra note 85, dictates invalidation of
the arbitration clause, and that Scherk upheld an arbitration clause only because it was an
international agreement). Justice Blackmun also indicated distrust of the arbitration process:
"Despite improvements in the process of arbitration and changes in the judicial attitude to-
wards it, several aspects of arbitration that were seen by the Wilko court to be inimical to the
policy of investor protection still remain." Id. at 257 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Ste-
vens wrote a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun that the rule in Wilko should
control. Id. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Section 1404(a) reads: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
94. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
95. Id. at 32. Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that there is no conflict between § 1404(a)
and Alabama law disfavoring such clauses, and that federal judges should defer to state law
when possible. Id. at 38-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 31.
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instead of focusing on the validity of forum selection clauses, focused on
section 1404(a).Y The Court held that section 1404(a) envisions a bal-
ancing of interests, including convenience and fairness in light of both
the clause and the parties' relative bargaining power.98 Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor concurred in an opinion which added that the principles
developed in The Bremen also were applicable in a diversity case such as
Stewart.99 Justice Kennedy stated that "a valid forum selection clause is
given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases. '' tco
While Stewart set forth a balancing test with respect to forum selec-
tion clauses, its holding applies only to section 1404(a) transfers, 10 1 and
even then many courts continue to apply The Bremen standard."12
97. Id. at 30-31. Commentators viewed the Court's decision based on section 1404(a) as a
means of sidestepping the issue of forum selection clauses. See, eg., Linda S. Mullenix, An-
other Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory-Procedure in Federal
Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 336 (1988).
98. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29-30 ("The flexible and individualized analysis Congress pre-
scribed in § 1404(a) thus encompasses consideration of the parties' private expression of their
venue preferences."). The Court held that forum clauses are one factor to consider when a
federal court decides a transfer motion: "The forum-selection clause, which represents the
parties' agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive considera-
tion.., nor no consideration... but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in
§ 1404(a)." Id. at 31.
99. Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Diversity cases, as compared to cases involving
only federal issues, involve consideration of state laws, which gives rise to conflicts between
federal and state laws. Federal law is not necessarily dispositive on such conflicts, and there-
fore a federal holding does not bind federal courts in future diversity cases. See, e.g., Texas
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1981).
100. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence
more accurately represents the treatment of forum clauses in ensuing cases than does the ma-
jority opinion. See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 912
(3d Cir. 1988) (referring to Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Stewart), cert denied, 490 U.S.
1001 (1989). See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (referring to strict judicial adher-
ence to forum clauses).
101. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Stewart applies only to a § 1404(a) transfer which considers convenience and not
to a dismissal which involves the waiver of personal jurisdiction); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d
17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Stewart's balancing approach to forum selection clauses
does not apply when dismissing actions and remanding to state courts). The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1952), unlike Stewart, does not balance interests, but rather enforces
forum clauses unless they are unreasonably unfair or exceedingly inconvenient. Id. at 15, 18.
For a discussion of this aspect of The Bremen, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
102. See, eg., Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying The Bremen
standard to § 1404(a) transfer); First Interstate Leasing Serv. v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744, 746
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (relying on The Bremen and Stewart in § 1404(a) transfer). There is discord
within the federal circuits as to whether federal or state law should govern motions to dismiss
on the basis of a forum selection clause. See, e.g., Sun World Lines v. March Shipping Co.,
801 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1986) (using federal law); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Mari-
etta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (relying on state law); see also Robert
A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89
COLUM. L. Ra-v. 1068, 1071 (1989) (noting that most courts use federal law); Julia L. Erick-
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While a few federal courts have set aside forum selection clauses, 10 3 the
majority of cases have consistently enforced them."° In the most ex-
treme applications, the acceptance of forum selection clauses has forced
individuals to file suit in foreign countries,10 5 prompting some courts to
express discomfort in applying the doctrine. 1 6 Much of the controversy
and confusion surrounding forum selection clauses, however, is derived
from the conflicting areas of law that underlie the issue. Shute implicates
admiralty law, contract principles, and constitutional doctrine; to under-
stand thoroughly the forum selection clause in Shute, it is necessary to
analyze how these underlying legal issues affect such clauses.
A cruise ticket is subject to admiralty law;'0 7 as such, it must com-
son, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common
Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1090, 1096-97 (1988)
("[O]nly the Third and Eighth Circuits have held that when federal and state law conflict, state
law determines the enforceability of forum selection clauses in diversity suits.").
103. Weidner Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar Al Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302,
1309-10 (7th Cir. 1988) (striking down forum selection clause on three grounds: (1) unmet
condition precedent, (2) unequal bargaining power, and (3) duress); Farmland Indus. v. Fra-
zier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that where a de-
frauder owed the defrauded a fiduciary duty, a forum selection clause was vitiated); Yoder v.
Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759-60 (E.D. Va. 1986) (finding clause against
individual unfair); ECC Computer Ctrs. v. Entre Computer Ctrs., 597 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-86
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding clause against Illinois public policy).
104. See, eg., Moses v. Business Card Express, 929 F.2d 1131, 1136-37 (6th Cir.) (holding
that in a § 1404(a) transfer the forum clause "figures centrally"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81
(1991); Karl Koch Erection Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659-
60 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding forum clause in breach of contract case); Samson Plastic Conduit
& Pipe Corp. v. Battenfeld Extrusionstechnik, GmbH, 718 F. Supp. 886, 892 (M.D. Ala. 1989)
(upholding forum clause written in German); Sagge, 697 F. Supp. at 747-48 (upholding forum
clause in lease for vending equipment). For a discussion on the enforceability of forum selec-
tion clauses generally, see Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provi-
sion Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 404, 415-42
(1984).
105. Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Servs., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1991) (em-
ployee who had worked for American corporation in Saudi Arabia forced to sue in Saudi
Arabia); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 912-16 (3d Cir. 1988)
(American passenger on Italian cruise ship departing from and returning to Italy forced to sue
in Italy), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Hollander v. K-Lines Hellenic Cruises, S.A., 670
F. Supp. 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (American passenger on cruise departing from Greece
forced to sue in Greece). It should be noted that in these cases, in addition to entering into
contracts containing forum selection clauses, the plaintiffs entered the foreign forums in con-
nection with the contracts. Since the foreign forum had a genuine interest in the matter and
since the plaintiffs had subjected themselves to a foreign jurisdiction by entering it, it was less
offensive to force them to litigate there than it would have been for someone who had never
entered the jurisdiction. The Hodes court acknowledged, "We note this is not a case in which
a consumer contracted to have a service rendered or buy a product in his/her home jurisdic-
tion only to later learn of the existence of a forum selection clause." Hodes, 858 F.2d at 913.
106. Spradlin, 926 F.2d at 869 (court acknowledged it was "troubled" with forcing Ameri-
can citizen to sue in Saudi Arabia).
107. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1525.
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ply with the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act."'s Section 183c
of the Act provides that a vessel owner may not contract to lessen or
weaken the right of a party to sue in negligence for bodily injury.1 9 A
plaintiff's case clearly is weakened when witnesses will be unavailable in
the distant forum.' 10 It is not as clear, however, that forcing litigation in
a distant forum lessens a plaintiff's right to recover. While there is some
evidence that the Act supports a liberal interpretation,"' the Shute ma-
jority discounted the Act on the grounds that there is no authority that
the Act was intended to "avoid having a plaintiff travel to a distant fo-
rum."" 2 Since the Act is silent as to forum selection clauses, the better
reading is that the Act does not apply to forum selection clauses.
While most forum clauses do not involve admiralty law, all forum
clauses involve the intersection of jurisdiction and contract law." 3 It is
evident that such clauses are treated differently from other contract
terms since they affect jurisdiction, which is grounded in due process." 4
Since forum selection clauses involve the application of contract law to
jurisdiction, it is necessary to consider both areas of law.
108. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-96 (1988).
109. Id. § 183c. For the text of § 183c, see supra note 40.
110. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Section 183c, passed in 1936, Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, § 2, 49 Stat. 1480 (codified
at 46 U.S.C. app. § 183e), was enacted at a time when forum selection clauses were predomi-
nately rejected, and there would have been no reason to insert a provision for forum clauses.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even though the Act does not expressly
forbid forum selection clauses, Stevens maintained that there are indications that it was Con-
gress's intent to prohibit such provisions. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, it is clear
that the gist of § 183c is to protect claimants against vessel owners, an end that the rejection of
the forum clauses furthers. Justice Stevens cited to the House Report, which stated, referring
to an amendment pertaining to arbitration clauses, " 'The amendment... is intended to...
put a stop to all such practices and practices of a like character."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936)) (emphasis omitted). A liberal
interpretation of the Act is further supported by similar cases arising under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1988), which hold that forum selection clauses are
limitations on liability. See, eg., Hughes Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840,
842 (5th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
112. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
113. See Mullenix, supra note 97, at 296 ("Although [forum selection clauses] affect basic
procedural rights, their interpretation is nonetheless irretrievably based in contract law.").
114. The Bremen Court, for example, held that forum clauses are to be enforced "unless
.'unreasonable' under the circumstances." The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 10 (1971); see supra note 78. Stewart held that such clauses are merely to be analyzed with
respect to convenience and fairness to the parties. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
27, 29 (1988); see supra note 98 and accompanying text. These are unusual requirements of
contract terms. Convenience is generally irrelevant in contract law unless the inconvenience
rises to the level of impossibility, see, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 57, § 1320; similarly, contract
law does not require reasonableness unless the unreasonableness rises to the level of unconscio-
nability, see, e.g., id. § 128.
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While contract law generally enforces the terms of agreements, ex-
ceptions are sometimes made for unconscionable contracts.'" One such
contract is an adhesion contract, in which a disparity in bargaining
power precludes one party from having a meaningful choice and there-
fore deprives her of the ability to negotiate contract terms meaning-
fully."' Disparity of bargaining power alone, however, will not
invalidate a contract.'17 Invalidation of contract terms on grounds of
adhesion generally requires unfairness in two areas regarding the con-
tract: the procedure by which the contract was entered and the sub-
stance of the contract." 8 The procedural strand usually refers to some
form of surprise, often fine print,"I9 while the substantive strand requires
that the terms be unfair.120 Generally, courts are less likely to invalidate
115. The Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to the sale of goods, states:
The basic test [for unconscionability] is whether, in the light of the general commer-
cial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract.... The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power.
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. (1978) (citation omitted). This language embodies the common-law treat-
ment of adhesion. Id. (citing cases illustrating the basis for § 2.302 and adhesion).
116. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (setting forth the standard for unconscionability as "includ[ing] an absence of meaning-
ful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasona-
bly favorable to the other party."); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404,
161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (invalidating a contract clause which would exculpate auto manufac-
turer from liability to purchaser); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts ofAdhesion: An Essay in Recon-
struction, 96 HARv. L. R1v. 1173, 1245-48 (1983) (questioning the validity of adhesion
contracts); Mark J. Kelson, Comment, Choice-of-Law, Venue, and Consent-to-Jurisdiction Pro-
visions in California Commercial Lending Agreements: Can Good Draftsmanship Overcome
Bad Choice-of-Law Doctrine?, 23 LOy. L.A. L. Rnv. 1337, 1371 (1990) (referring to setting
aside forum clauses on grounds of unconscionability).
117. Eg., Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984); Pres-
ton v. Kruezer, 641 F. Supp, 1163, 1172-73 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
118. See, e.g., Premier Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431,
1440 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (referring to procedural and substantive elements of an unconscion-
ability claim), aff'd, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988). Other courts hold that such contracts are
only invalid if unreasonably unfair, but this usually involves the procedural and substantive
elements. E.g., Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 543-44 (D. Neb. 1976)
(holding that, in general, boilerplate clauses are valid if not unreasonably unfair to the weaker
party), aff'd, 571 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
119. See, e.g., Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.
1984) ("The evidence disclosed ... that there was in fact no bargaining on the clause in
question. It was contained in a form contract in fine print at the bottom of a page.... [Tjhis
sort of take-it-or-leave-it clause will be disregarded."); Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc.
v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495, 1509 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding a disclaimer of warranty
clause ineffective because written in small letters and buried in a paragraph), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 786 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1986).
120. See, e.g., Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 959-60 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding
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a contract on grounds of adhesion when the contract is commercial or
when the parties are business entities, because in those circumstances
courts expect the parties to be knowledgeable.121 Before Shute, dealing
with forum selection clauses had involved only commercial contracts; the
Court had never addressed directly the issue of adhesion. In Shute,
which involved an individual plaintiff, the Court, therefore, should have
scrutinized the clause under an adhesion analysis.
While the majority makes no mention of adhesion anywhere in the
opinion, the scrutiny for "fundamental fairness" may have incorporated
principles of adhesion. If this is so, however, it is difficult to see how the
Court could so readily enforce the clause.122 The absence of an adhesion
analysis in the opinion may indicate that the Court disfavors, or rejects,
adhesion as a defense to a forum clause; the Court, however, neglects to
justify this judicial coup, which overthrows a fundamental contract
principle.
Ironically, the Court in Shute noted the disparity of bargaining
power and used that finding to enforce the clause.' 23 The Bremen em-
phasized the importance of negotiation in order to ensure that the parties
have entered willingly and knowingly into an agreement limiting the fo-
rum. "'24 The Court in Shute reasoned that since The Bremen involved
international shipping, it was reasonable to expect negotiation in that
context; but that since a cruise ship passenger normally would not nego-
tiate his contract, it is unreasonable to read The Bremen as requiring that
a forum selection clause in such a contract be negotiated.125 The Court
seems simply to do away with a requirement that cannot be met by stat-
ing that in precedent cases it was reasonable to expect the requirement to
be met. 126 This circular reasoning disarms a principal bastion defending
termination clause, stating that "[t]he basic test... is whether... the clauses at issue are so
one-sided as to be oppressive and unfair"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
121. See, eg., York v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (N.D. Miss. 1984)
(referring to plaintiff's knowledge and sophistication as evidence that he consented to forum
clause and, consequently, that no procedural unconscionability was present).
122. See infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text (arguing that the facts in Shute support
a finding of adhesion).
123. Shute, 11l S. Ct. at 1527.
124. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972); supra note 74
(discussing The Bremen).
125. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
126. This form of logic leads to bizarre results. To illustrate: In a case in which a passen-
ger purchased his ticket after just having exhibited erratic behavior and after having displayed
signs of psychological infirmity, the Court presumably would deny the defense of lack of ca-
pacity since one with severe mental problems would never have capacity. Or in a case in which
the passenger was illiterate or did not speak English, this reasoning would seemingly do away
with any requirement of notice since it would be unreasonable to expect such a person to have
1992]
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personal jurisdiction set forth in The Bremen.'27 Since this leaves one of
the protections provided for in The Bremen only to those most capable of
negotiating, it is an illogical interpretation of The Bremen. Not only does
the individual lack bargaining power in the formation of the contract, she
also has this disparity used against her in its enforcement. Instead of
squarely addressing the adhesion issue, the Court employed questionable
reasoning to circumvent the element of negotiation, integral to The
Bremen, that would have called into question the validity of the clause;
clearly, the issue deserves more consideration.
One requisite of adhesion is procedural unfairness.12 Justice Ste-
vens pointed out that Mrs. Shute did not receive her tickets until after
they had been purchased.129 She, therefore, had no opportunity to see
the clause until after she had paid her fare. In addition, the contract
stated that the tickets could not be refunded. 3 ' Justice Stevens argued
that "the average passenger," not knowing whether or not that provision
is legally enforceable, "would accept the risk of having to fie suit in Flor-
ida in the event of an injury, rather than canceling-without a refund-a
planned vacation at the last minute."'' This reasoning is persuasive.
The unanticipated clause, in a contract viewable only after payment, that
presents itself as nonrefundable, constitutes as much a surprise to the
consumer as unreasonably fine print or other deceptive practices, thereby
meeting the procedural requirement for a finding of adhesion. 3 '
notice of a provision written in English. This form of logic can cripple any precedent and
effectively rewrite any area of law.
127. The Bremen's references to negotiation and arm's length dealing reflect that the Court
in The Bremen did not envision a disparity in bargaining power depriving a citizen of her
jurisdictional rights. The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972) ("There are compelling reasons why a
freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by... overweening bargaining
power... should be given full effect." (footnote omitted)). Other protections afforded by The
Bremen were that forum clauses should be neither unreasonable nor unjust. Id. at 15; see
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
129. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority was content that Mrs.
Shute had notice of the clause and ignored any further discussion of adhesion. Id. at 1528.
Mere notice of a term, however, is not dispositive on the issue of adhesion. See, e.g., Henning-
son v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 399-403, 161 A.2d 69, 92-95 (1960) (focusing on
the lack of bargaining power and the likelihood that the consumer will not understand the
terms).
130. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" '[T]he Carrier shall not be liable
to make any refund to passengers in respect of ... tickets wholly or partly not used by a
passenger.'" (quoting the contract)).
131. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Justice Stevens felt that the contract itself so eloquently illustrated the argument for
invalidating the contract that he appended a copy of the relevant ticket provisions to the opin-
ion. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The clause must also be examined for substantive unfairness. 133
Under the terms of the contract, Mrs. Shute must litigate her claims in
the opposite corner of the country, thereby giving the cruise line an ad-
vantage.134 Mrs. Shute must work long-distance with attorneys she may
never see, and she may have to travel to Florida in pursuit of her claim.
In some cases, the added costs and burdens of distant litigation would
deter suits. 131 Considering the size of the parties, it is relatively more
burdensome for Mrs. Shute to litigate cross-country than it would be for
Carnival. Furthermore, the cruise line could easily account for litigation
costs in the fare, instead of placing all of the costs on those passengers
filing suit. The majority defended the substance of the clause on the
grounds that "passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause
like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting
the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may
be sued."1 36 While it is clear that Carnival incurs lower legal costs due to
such clauses, it is most likely that only some of the savings, if any, are
relayed to the passengers.1 37 Even assuming that all the savings are
passed on when the cruise's legal costs are lowered, passengers who are
risk averse are better off without the clause.1 3 ' Therefore, considering
the relatively high burden of having an individual conduct litigation
across the country, there are sufficient grounds in Shute to find substan-
133. See supra notes 118, 120 and accompanying text.
134. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Litigating in Florida] certainly
lessens or weakens [the Shutes'] ability to recover for the slip and fall incident that occurred off
the west coast of Mexico during the cruise that originated and terminated in Los Angeles,
California."); see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 488 (1985) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("[Enforcement of a forum clause] creates a potential for unfairness not only in nego-
tiations between franchisors and their franchisees but, more significantly, in the resolution of
the disputes [that follow.]").
135. See Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986); infra
note 198 (quoting the Yoder court on this issue). As Justice Stevens noted, contracts limiting
liability for negligence are generally void as against public policy. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1530
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
137. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 22, at S12 ("Apart from the justices, are there any
consumers naive enough to buy this reduced-fare theory?").
138. When such clauses are used, passengers save a relatively small amount of money and
are forced to bear the risk of litigating away from home. The Court implies that individuals
prefer to save small amounts of money rather than to avert great risks. See Shute, 111 S. Ct. at
1527. This premise is not well founded; American society is fraught with examples of risk
aversion and risk spreading. The insurance industry, among others, is founded upon the prin-
ciple of risk aversion and risk spreading. In addition, strict liability is based on similar princi-
ples. See, eg., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 93-94 (1973) (describing
theory that strict liability rests on risk spreading). For an explanation of risk aversion, see
ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 86-98 (2d ed. 1987).
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tive unfairness.13 9
Thus, in Shute there is sufficient evidence of both procedural and
substantive unfairness." 4° On contract principles alone, therefore, the
clause is unenforceable; however, the clause is also in conflict with tenets
of due process. It is necessary first to analyze the plaintiff's procedural
rights, and then to determine what is required to waive those rights.
Forum selection clauses involve two aspects of jurisdiction: first, a
forum selection clause operates as a waiver of personal jurisdiction in the
specified forum; second, it limits venue to a particular forum. 141 The
requirement of personal jurisdiction, founded in the Due Process
Clause, 142 serves to protect parties from judgments entered by forums
with which the party has no substantial contact. 143 Distant litigation ex-
poses a party to added burdens and costs;144 as a result, forcing an indi-
vidual to litigate a claim in a distant forum represents too great a burden
upon him to comply with due process. 4 1 Cases dealing with personal
jurisdiction typically concern the fairness to the defendant of litigating in
139. This does not necessarily mean that all forum clauses entered by consumers fail a test
for substantive unfairness. When considering the substantive unfairness that forum clauses
pose to consumers, the most significant factor, encompassing both legal costs and inconven-
ience, is distance. As such, the court must determine in every case whether the unfairness of
forcing the plaintiff to sue in a distant forum rises to the level needed to invalidate the clause.
Had Mrs. Shute lived in Georgia, for example, the unfairness of the clause might not be great
enough to render it unenforceable, but somewhere between Florida and the state of Washing-
ton the clause inflicts a measure of injustice that surpasses tolerable dimensions. Shute pro-
vides no guidance for this line drawing since it inexplicably ignores the element of adhesion in
the contract.
140. In National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1963), Justice Black disfa-
vored a clause waiving personal jurisdiction on similar grounds, stating, "Where one party, ....
drawing upon expert legal advice, drafts a form contract, complete with waivers of rights and
privileges by the other, it seems to me to defy common sense.., to treat this as an agreement
coolly negotiated and hammered out by equals." Id. at 326 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting).
141. See, eg., Mullenix, supra note 97, at 294 (stating that "it is unclear whether forum-
selection clauses are matters of jurisdiction or venue"). Under the civil-law system, analogous
waivers are called derogation (excluding specified courts thereby limiting venue) and proroga-
tion (consenting to jurisdiction) agreements. See, eg., Oser, supra note 2, at 311-12.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deprive any person of... property,
without due process of law ....").
143. See, eg., World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
144. In reference to war, William Shakespeare wrote, "'Tis better that the enemy seek us;/
So shall he waste his means, weary his soldiers,/ Doing himself offence, whilst we, lying still,/
Are full of rest, defence, and nimbleness." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 4, sC.
2, lines 249-52 (The New Cambridge ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). This passage applies
equally to lawsuits in which the litigants prefer the luxury of defending at home while their
adversaries are frustrated and burdened with long-distance litigation.
145. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("To require
the [defendant] to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on
more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the
[defendant] to comport with due process.").
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the plaintiff's chosen forum.146 If the individual resisting enforcement of
a forum selection clause is the defendant, she can rely on case law dealing
with a defendant's waiver of personal jurisdiction.147 If, however, the
individual challenging a forum clause is the plaintiff, she must first estab-
lish that she has a right to sue in a forum with which she has substantial
contacts.
Fairness to the plaintiff generally is not in issue, since the plaintiff
chose the forum in which to bring suit, and therefore case law is scant on
the issue of a plaintiff's rights. There is, however, evidence that a plain-
tiff is entitled to due process considerations similar to those that protect
the defendant. The Due Process Clause, applying to "persons," inti-
mates no intention to exclude plaintiffs;' 48 accordingly, the Court has
recognized that the borders of this protective language extend beyond the
rights of defendants.' 49 Similarly, the Court has embraced an expansive
interpretation of "property" that goes beyond "real estate, chattels, or
money," 150 and includes legal claims.' A plaintiff's legal claim, there-
fore, qualifies as an "interest in property" that deserves the protections
afforded by the Constitution. Additionally, the degree of protection
should be identical to that afforded the defendant in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 52 since the considerations are essentially the same.
International Shoe was concerned with having a defendant travel to
a distant forum or suffer a default judgment.'53 Forcing distant litigation
on the plaintiff, however, presents comparable considerations. Both
plaintiff and defendant, facing distant litigation, can travel and pursue
the claim, in which case the burdens, in terms of added costs, are equal.
If they forgo the suit, the difference is only a conceptual one: a defendant
146. See, eg., Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ("The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts
to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants.").
147. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (defining requisites for waiver of per-
sonal jurisdiction).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 142 (quoting the relevant text of this
constitutional provision).
149. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) ("The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does protect 'persons,' not 'defendants'.....
150. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), overruled in part by Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
151. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (cause of action is protected under the
Due Process Clause); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 ("To have a property interest ... [an
individual must] have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are a property right).
152. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
153. Id. at 317.
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suffers a judgment whereas a plaintiff bears the loss of a claim. What is
relevant is that the parties are forced to have their property rights deter-
mined in a forum with which they have no substantial contacts. It was
precisely this consideration that led to the minimum contacts require-
ment of International Shoe; the plaintiff, therefore, should be afforded the
same protection courts give the defendant under similar considerations,
and she should not be forced to litigate in a forum with which she has no
substantial contacts.
Additionally, other holdings of the Court provide a strong inference
that plaintiffs have rights to due process. Much of the Court's language
concerning due process does not limit its application to the defendant, 15 4
and many cases that decide the propriety of asserting personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant emphasize the importance of convenience to the
plaintiff. 55 Furthermore, the Court has, in contexts other than consider-
ing personal jurisdiction, afforded the plaintiff essential fairness consider-
ations concerning the forum. 56 The Court has, therefore, implicitly
recognized that plaintiffs as well as defendants have due process rights.
These principles, although never embodied in a rule expressing a
plaintiff's right to due process, are incorporated in the general rule that a
plaintiff's chosen forum will seldom be disturbed; this is often referred to
as the Gilbert doctrine because it was first developed in GulfOil Corp. v.
Gilbert.1 57 As Justice Jackson stated, "[T]here is good reason why [the
dispute] should be tried in the plaintiff's home forum .... He should not
154. See, e'g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) ("The Due Process
Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of
a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts' .... " (quoting International
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ) (emphasis added)); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.").
155. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) ("We have
previously explained that.., the reasonableness... of jurisdiction in each case will depend on
an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the
interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief." (emphasis added));
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) ("[The defendant's bur-
den of challenging personal jurisdiction] will in an appropriate case be considered in light of
other relevant factors, including.., the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief.., at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to
choose the forum .... (emphasis added) (citing Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84,
92 (1978) and Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977)).
156. See; e.g., Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960) (holding that the defendant
cannot transfer venue to a jurisdiction where the plaintiff could not have sued initially, since
allowing him to do so would be unfair to the plaintiff).
157. 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."); see also National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 325 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The right to have a case
tried locally and be spared the likely injustice of having to litigate in a distant or burdensome
forum is as ancient as the Magna Charta." (citation omitted)). But see Peter G. McAllen,
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be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home jurisdiction .... ,,1'8
This sentiment resounds throughout lower court opinions that require an
enormous finding of inconvenience to the defendant, the court, and the
witnesses to support a transfer.1" 9 Disturbing this deference to the plain-
tiff's forum would remove the keystone from the framework of tradi-
tional American procedure that maintains the balance between the
parties, and thereby would expose the plaintiff to vexatious litigation.1' °
This right is, of course, subject to waiver, 6 ' but the Court has an-
nounced reservations toward waiver, such as limiting enforcement to ne-
gotiated contracts 62  and directing courts to consider the relative
bargaining power. 16 Contract provisions pertaining to personal jurisdic-
tion, a constitutional right,'" are inherently unlike other contract provi-
sions such as price or terms of delivery. 61 Considering the gravity of
Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 191, 208 (1989) (criticiz-
ing the interpretation of Gilbert as giving deference to the plaintiff's forum).
158. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
159. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 41 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("Apparently
[only] one jurisdiction stands squarely behind the proposition that a court may decline to hear
a personal injury suit, brought by a bona fide resident, in order to spare the defendant incon-
venience and expense."); see, e.g., Erbamont, Inc. v. Cetus Corp., 720 F. Supp. 387, 396-97 (D.
Del. 1989); Entenmann's, Inc. v. King Bees Distrib. Co., 692 F. Supp. 157, 159-60 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
160. "Thus, [Shute] throws out of kilter the federal court's long-standing, traditional defer-
ence to a plaintiff's choice of forum." Mullenix, supra note 22, at S12.
161. See, eg., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 704-05 (1982) (waiver of personal jurisdiction can be voluntary or involuntary); Szukhent,
375 U.S. at 316. For a discussion of Szukhent, see supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
162. See, eg., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) ("Where...
forum-selection provisions have been obtained through 'freely negotiated' agreements and are
not 'unreasonable and unjust,'. . . their enforcement does not offend due process.") (citing
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
163. Id. at 486 ("[J]urisdiction may not be grounded on a contract whose terms have been
obtained through... 'overweening bargaining power' and whose application would render
litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient [as to deprive the plaintiff] of his day in
court."' (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12, 18)); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (holding that district court must consider convenience "and the fairness of
transfer in light of the forum-selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining power"); see
supra notes 89-101 (discussing Stewart).
164. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
165. Nearly one hundred years before The Bremen, the Court stated, "Every citizen is
entitled to resort to all the courts of the country, and to invoke the protection which all the
laws or all those courts may afford him. A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or
his substantial rights." Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). Although
reflective of rejected notions that forum clauses are per se invalid, French v. LaFayette Ins.
Co., 9 F. Cas. 788, 789 (C.C.D. Ind. 1853) (No. 5102), aff'd, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856)
(discussed supra note 56 and accompanying text), this language reflects the value traditionally
placed on jurisdictional rights, which exists to a lesser degree in modem times, see supra notes
161-63 and accompanying text.
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this right, courts have an added interest in making sure that its waiver is
truly the party's intention. 16 6 The notion that waivers of constitutional
rights merit more consideration by the parties than do other contractual
waivers is not confined to the relinquishment of personal jurisdiction.
The Court has previously struck down a waiver of the rights to re-
ceive notice and to have a hearing in a civil proceeding when the relevant
provision was printed in small type on a form contract. 16 7 In a criminal
context the Court has announced that a waiver of constitutional rights
must be done "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly."16 Similarly,
when waiving the right to counsel, the Court has required that the de-
fendant do so "competent[ly] and intelligent[ly]." 169 Regarding waivers
of constitutional rights, the Court has stated that " 'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental Constitutional
rights and that [courts] 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fun-
damental rights.' "170 For an individual to yield a fundamental right
provided by the Constitution, therefore, the Court has consistently held
that the individual must intelligently and competently renounce her
right.
The right of the plaintiff to obtain judicial relief in a forum where he
is subject to personal jurisdiction is an implicit constitutional principle
that is well established in legal doctrine;171 its surrender, therefore, re-
quires meaningful consent from the parties. 172 In Shute, since payment
for the cruise tickets occurred before reading the contract was possible, it
is absurd to consider payment to be a meaningful consent. The only ac-
tion arguably demonstrating consent was that of the Shutes boarding the
cruise ship once they had received their tickets. Even this conduct,
though, does not rise to the level of meaningful consent since the Court
can not "presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." 17 In
a similar setting, the Court has held invalid a waiver of rights to due
166. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332 (1964) (Black,
J., dissenting) (stating that a form contract is insufficient to override the constitutional right to
be sued at home).
167. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-97 (1972).
168. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
169. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954); Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 70-71
(1942). The rule discussed was set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
170. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937), and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307
(1937)).
171. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 161-70.
173. See Johnson, 305 U.S. at 464; supra text accompanying note 170. A finding of mean-
ingful consent in Shute requires a mountain of presumptions. The Court first must have pre-
sumed that the Shutes understood the legal consequences of a forum selection clause. Next the
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process that was printed in small type on a form contract. 174 The Court
in Shute failed to recognize that forum selection clauses represent a
threat to due process, and that, as such, their use should require the par-
ties' meaningful consent. Thus, the Court replaced what had been an
iron fortress protecting individuals from distant litigation with a thatch
hut, the walls of which are easily penetrated by fine print and shrewd
business practices.175
Instead of addressing the contractual and constitutional principles
underlying forum selection clauses, the Court emphasized policy reasons
supporting forum clauses. Forum selection clauses admittedly provide
many benefits to the parties and to the courts. 176 The Court in The
Bremen emphasized that in international contracts there may be contact
with myriad forums, thus exposing the parties to uncertainty and
inconvenience. 177  This predictability assured by forum clauses
encourages international trade, 178 thereby promoting American indus-
Court must have presumed that the Shutes knew of its enforceability. Finally, the Court must
have presumed that the Shutes agreed to its contents.
174. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-97 (1972); supra text accompanying note 167.
175. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 97, at 296 ("Contract principles now effectively usurp
long-standing jurisdictional ... rules, but courts and commentators have devoted scant atten-
tion to the deleterious effects of this quiet revolution."). The Court's opinion invites the whole-
sale use of forum selection clauses by corporations against consumers. See infra notes 194-98
and accompanying text. The Court's holding essentially allows contract clauses to undermine
the plaintiff's due process rights without the plaintiff's meaningful consent. Addressing the
waiver of due process, Justice Black wrote,
Where one party, at its leisure and drawing upon expert legal advice, drafts a
form contract, complete with waivers of rights and privileges by the other, it seems to
me to defy common sense for this Court to formulate a federal rule designed to treat
this as an agreement coolly negotiated and hammered out by equals.
[I]t exhausts credulity to think that [the plaintiffs] or any other laymen
reading these legalistic words would have known or even suspected that they
amounted to an agreement [to be sued away from home.] This Court should not
permit valuable constitutional rights to be destroyed by any such sharp contractual
practices.
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326, 332-33 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
176. See, eg., Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Se-
lection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422, 424 (1991) ("[IThe
enforcement of reasonable forum-selection clauses protects the expectations of contracting par-
ties, preserves the equities of the agreement, respects freedom of contract, encourages trade,
and conserves judicial resources by limiting pretrial struggles over where to litigate." (foot-
notes omitted)).
177. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13 (1972); see supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
178. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. This furtherance of international trade was also raised in
Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974), see supra note 85; and in Shear-
son/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987), see supra note 88.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
try.1 79 Such clauses also conserve judicial resources and spare "litigants
the time and expense of pretrial motions to determine the correct fo-
rum.9)1 80 These themes had been sounded previously by the Court, but
never in the context of binding an individual in a noncommercial con-
tract. It is therefore necessary to reanalyze the merits of forum selection
clauses in the context of a cruise contract.
Shute, echoing The Bremen,""' stated that refusing to enforce the
forum clause would expose a cruise line to suit in several forums since its
passengers are from varied locales.18 2 Contrasted with The Bremen,
which involved only one contract, the cruise line entered into as many
contracts as there were passengers, thereby voluntarily subjecting itself to
several forums. In addition to lacking support on fairness grounds, the
Court's reasoning also lacks support on the basis of efficiency. Two situ-
ations must be distinguished here: a mass disaster at sea involving sev-
eral plaintiffs with similar claims," 3 and an isolated incident involving
only one plaintiff. In the former scenario, a forum selection clause assists
in consolidating the litigation and potentially conserves resources;184 in
the latter setting, however, the clause does not produce efficiency in liti-
gation. Invalidating the forum selection clause will subject the cruise line
to suit in several forums, but forcing the passengers to litigate in the
chosen forum only shifts the burden from the cruise line to the passen-
gers. While this burden-shifting is permissible in a freely negotiated
agreement, it is questionable when done through an adhesion contract
affecting constitutional rights.
The Shute Court bolstered its affirmation of forum selection clauses
by claiming that such clauses promote judicial economy;185 this, how-
ever, is a questionable assumption. Under the Court's holding plaintiffs
still can argue against such clauses on grounds of "fundamental fair-
179. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229; Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-20; The Bremen, 407 U.S. at
9; see POSNER, supra note 138, at 41-44 (discussing economic benefits of contracts); see also
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1-9
(1979) (broadly addressing the economics of contract law).
180. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
181. The Bremen envisioned a suit between two parties that might be filed in one of several
forums since many forums may be affected in an international shipping agreement. See The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13.
182. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
183. See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 906-07 (3d
Cir. 1988) (terrorists hijacked a cruise ship), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989).
184. See, e.g., Ballard Medical Prods., Inc. v. Concord Labs, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 796, 801
(D. Del. 1988) (stating that it is efficient to litigate all claims "in one place, before one court").
185. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1527. The Bremen did not mention judicial efficiency in enforcing
forum clauses, but it may have been an underlying factor in its decision.
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ness,"1 86 and since such clauses may conflict with common-law princi-
ples of adhesion contracts, they are likely to be disfavored. 87 The
Court's holding may have done little more than shift the focus of the
litigation. In addition, contrasted with a commercial case involving busi-
nesses, the judicial resources used in determining the forum in an individ-
ual's noncommercial case are less burdened since the issue is less
complex.18 8 If the Court wanted to promote judicial efficiency, it could
have done so more equitably by invalidating forum selection clauses in
noncommercial contracts, including cruise contracts, and invoking the
Gilbert doctrine,189 which favors the plaintiff's chosen forum absent
compelling reasons to dismiss or transfer the case.
While Shute employed some of the considerations found in The
Bremen, no mention was made of the promotion of commerce and Amer-
ican industry that was integral to The Bremen and subsequent cases.19
This economic argument does not apply as forcefully in cases like Shute.
First, it is arguable that cruise contracts, being primarily recreational, are
not the type of transaction deserving judicial encouragement envisioned
by previous cases.' 91 Second, it is not likely that cruise lines will trade
elsewhere or that Americans will be denied cruises if American courts
reject their forum clauses. 192 To think that invalidating forum selection
clauses would induce Carnival to redirect its marketing to Mexico or
186. Id. at 1528.
187. See supra notes 115-39 and accompanying text.
188. A business or corporation may conduct substantial business in several locales, thereby
being subject to suit in several forums. Additionally, since commercial contracts often affect
many states, several forums may have an interest in the matter. Commercial contracts, there-
fore, are likely to have several plausible forums since the contracts and the parties contact
many states. If a cruise line faces a consolidation of suits arising from a similar incident,
forum selection clauses eliminate substantial litigation since there are many potential forums.
In an isolated suit, however, litigation concerning a cruise is less likely to have several suitable
forums since the plaintiff will generally favor only her home forum and since only a limited
number of jurisdictions will have an interest in the matter.
189. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (favoring plaintiff's forum); see
supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
190. See, eg., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) ("[A] contractual
provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be
applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business transaction.").
191. For example, The Bremen Court stated, "Thus, in the light of present-day commercial
realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the forum clause should control
." The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
192. The Bremen stressed that if American courts deny forum selection clauses, Americans
will be impaired in international trading. Id. at 9. The Court argued that "the expansion of
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if... we insist on a parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.... [Invalidating
forum clauses] would be a heavy hand indeed on the future development of international com-
mercial dealings by Americans." Id.
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Canada, for example, is unreasonable. Additionally, there was no evi-
dence that other countries would enforce such a clause on a cruise
contract. 193
The contract in Shute, therefore, differed greatly from the contract
in The Bremen and subsequent cases. The previous cases concerned
commercial contracts and their reasoning supporting forum clauses does
not apply correspondingly in an individual's noncommercial contract.
Not only did the Court effectively condone the extirpation of fundamen-
tal rights rooted deeply in the American legal landscape, it did so on
inapplicable precedent and diluted arguments.
In addition to distorting precedent and abandoning established prin-
ciples, the Court failed to realize the implications of its holding. Shute is
an admiralty case and, therefore, has no binding effect on diversity
cases;194 however, there is reason to believe that its holding will apply to
diversity cases as well. The Bremen, too, was an admiralty case, but the
tentacles of its holding soon became firmly attached to diversity cases as
well as admiralty cases.195 Shute, therefore, is likely to affect diversity
cases, potentially exposing all individuals to the hazards of litigating in
distant forums.
Guided by Shute, manufacturers of products and providers of serv-
ices are encouraged to affix in every contract a clause designating that all
suits be brought in their home forums. While lack of notice is still a
defense under Shute, courts are amenable to findings of constructive no-
tice or of a duty to discover the provision. 96 Thus a patron who slips
and falls in a movie theater may be required to litigate her claim, if at all,
in the home forum of the corporation due to a clause on her ticket. A
consumer injured by a defective automobile could be limited to filing suit
in the remote forum of the manufacturer due to a forum clause on the
sales form, while the dealer that sold the automobile might be protected
193. The Bremen stressed that other countries enforce forum clauses in international agree-
ments, which furthered the need for American courts to enforce them, too. Id. at 11 ("[Favor-
ing forum clauses] is substantially ... followed in other common-law countries including
England."). For a discussion of other countries' treatment of forum clauses, see Gilbert, supra
note 2, at 20-24.
194. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1988) (stating that
although The Bremen is "instructive" it does not control diversity cases).
195. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 909-10 (3d
Cir. 1988) (referring to whether or not there was sufficient warning and to the nature of the
forum clause itself; requiring that "ticket provisions... meet a practical 'standard of reason-
able communicativeness"' (quoting Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir.),
cerL denied, 484 U.S. 852 (1987))), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); see also John D.
Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 341, 341-42 (1947)
(stating the traditional rule that parties have a duty to read).
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from suit in the purchaser's forum by notice on the doors that entering
the premises signifies acceptance of a specified forum for all claims. The
gains that International Shoe 197 and its progeny made toward allowing
plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions will be largely recaptured by
corporations in a frenzy to lower legal costs. 9 '
The decision in Shute stands on a precarious foundation of flawed
reasoning and the Court's inability to recognize the ramifications of its
holding. Shute was an ideal case for arresting the progress of the forum
selection clause. As Judge Posner stated, "If ever there was a case for
stretching the concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was
Shute; and perhaps no stretch was necessary."' 199 Instead, the Court de-
prived the plaintiff of her traditional rights based on a contract in which
her only participation was payment and boarding ship.2' ° Regarding a
similar waiver, Justice Black stated, "This printed form provision buried
in a multitude of words is too weak an imitation of a genuine agreement
to be treated as a waiver of so important a constitutional safeguard as is
the right to be sued at home."' Ignoring contract principles as well as
fundamental rights to due process, the Court stripped the individual of
his jurisdictional shield and sheathed his sword of venue preference, thus
exposing the individual consumer to aggressive corporate practices and
the perils of distant litigation.
JOHN MCKINLEY KIRBY
197. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
198. One court has stated concerning these dangers:
The Court is wary of forum selection clauses that appear in form contracts between
individuals and large corporations. Routine enforcement of these clauses would un-
dercut the broad reach of a court's personal jurisdiction over corporations that do
business in many states. As in the case at hand, where the clause requires the filing of
a suit in a distant state it can serve as a large deterrent to the filing of suits by con-
sumers against large corporations.
Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Va. 1986).
199. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring
to the appellate decision in Shute).
200. See Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
201. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 328 (1964) (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Although Szukhent concerned only waiver of personal jurisdiction, Justice Black's com-
mentary applies equally to forum selection clauses since their effect, like the effect in Shute, is
that the plaintiff must forsake her home forum.
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